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Morally and Legally:
A Parent's Duty to Prevent the
Abuse of a Child as Defined by
Lane v. Commonwealth*
BY RACHEL S. ZAHNISER**
INTRODUCTION
nKentucky, 40,470 reports of child abuse, neglect, and dependency
were made in 1995, and 16,962 of those reports were
substantiated. In the same year, 63,313 Kentucky children were
reported as abused and/or neglected.2 Since 1988, these numbers have
steadily increased,3 and still the statistics do not reflect the many instances
of abuse that go unreported.
For example, a girl tells her mother that her stepfather is "'messing"'
with her and begs her mother to make him stop.5 The mother does not
actively participate in the abuse; however, she does nothing to prevent the
Thanks to William Fortune, Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law, University
of Kentucky, for his help in selecting this topic and to Karen Shuff Maurer,
Assistant Public Advocate, Department of Public Advocacy, for her insights into
Lane v. Commonwealth.
°" J.D. expected 1999,University of Kentucky.
1 See COMMONWEALTH OF KY. CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN DEP'T
FOR SOC. SERV., PROFILE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FISCAL YEAR 1995:
TREND CHARTS, FISCAL YEARS 1988-1995, at 2 (1995).
2 See id. at 3. This figure is higher because it refers to individual children,
whereas the 40,470 figure refers to reports that may include more than one child.
3 See id. at 2-3.
4 "[A]ccording to national studies, for every reported instance of child abuse,
two to three more cases are kept quiet." Holly Holland, More Children Being
Abused, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 7, 1994, at Al.
5 This hypothetical is based on the facts of Knox v. Commonwealth, 735 S.W.2d
711 (Ky. 1987) (quoting trial transcript), overruled byLane v. Commonwealth, 956
S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
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sexual abuse of her daughter, nor does she report the abuse.6 Should this
mother be convicted of complicity to commit rape?
Suppose a social worker notices bruises on a child's face. The child is
presently in his parents' custody, but has been removed from the home
before because of suspected abuse. The social worker does not report the
bruises to the court or take any action to protect the child. When the child
is killed by his father, should this social worker be convicted of complicity
to commit murder?7
Section 502.020(l)(c) ofthe Kentucky Revised Statutes, the complicity
statute, provides that "[a] person is guilty of an offense committed by
another" when that person has "a legal duty to prevent the commission of
the offense, [and] fails to make a proper effort to do so."8 The Kentucky
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a parent has a legal duty to
prevent the abuse of his or her child in Knox v. Commonwealth,9 on which
the first hypothetical is based. In Knox, the court found no legal duty to
prevent the abuse of the child."l
Ten years later, the Kentucky Supreme Court returned to this issue in
Lane v. Commonwealth." By a 3-2-2 vote, the court held that a parent does
have a legal duty to prevent the abuse of his or her child.'2 Three justices
ruled that a legal duty arises from Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes. 3 Two justices found a legal duty to act imposed by the common
law and statutory recognition of a "special relationship" between parent
and child.14 These justices stated that this "unique legal duty which a parent
6Seeid. at 711.
7This hypothetical is based on the facts of four cases involving the acquittal of
Wayne County, Kentucky, social workers who had been charged with complicity
to commit murder. The records of these cases have been expunged by the Wayne
County Circuit Court. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
8KY.REv. STAT.ANN. [hereinafterK.R.S.] § 502.020(1)(c) (Michie 1990). The
relevant portion of the complicity statute provides: "(1) A person is guilty of an
offense committed by another person when, with the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense, he: ... (c) [has] a legal duty to prevent
the commission of the offense, [and] fails to make a proper effort to do so."
9 Knox v. Commonwealth, 735 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1987), overruled by Lane v.
Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
'0 See id. at 712.
"Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1067 (1998).
12 See id. at 875-76.
13 See id. at 875.
14 See id. at 879 (Cooper, J., concurring).
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has to protect his child from harm arises from the 'special relationship'
which exists between any custodian and the person in his custody."'
5
Reasserting the court's position in Knox, the dissent maintained that while
a parent has a moral duty to protect his or her child, this duty is not a legal
one.
16
Part I of this Note examines Kentucky law regarding the criminal
liability of a passive parent before the Lane case. 7 Part II analyzes the three
different opinions in Lane.18 Part HI of this Note discusses the potential
impact of the Lane decision. 9 Finally, this Note concludes that the Lane
decision leaves the legal duty issue unsettled due to the court's divided
opinion, that the legislature intended this type of conduct to fall under the
criminal abuse statutes, and that the opinion as it stands inappropriately
expands the scope of complicity liability."
I. KENTUCKY LAW BEFORE LANE v. COMMONWEALTH:
KNOX v. COMMONWEALTH
The Kentucky Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether a
passive parent could be held criminally liable for the abuse of his or her
child in Knox v. Commonwealth.2' At trial, Charles Knox was convicted of
first degree rape, and his wife, Mary Knox, was found guilty of complicity
to commit first degree rape.22 The victim was Mary's daughter. According
to the evidence presented, Mary knew about the sexual relationship
between her husband Charles and her daughter.' Her daughter testified
"that she told Mary that Charles was 'messing' with her and pleaded with
her mother to make him stop." 24 Mary Knox did not take any action to stop
the abuse.25
15 See id. at 877 (Cooper, J., concurring).
'6See id. at 882-83 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
'7 See infra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
'8 See infra notes 51-202 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 203-46 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
21 Knox v. Commonwealth, 735 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1987), overruled by Lane v.
Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
12 Seeid. at 711.
See id.




The main issue examined by the Knox court was whether Mary Knox
"had a legal duty to make an effort to prevent the rape by Charles Knox. 26
The Commonwealth charged Mary Knox under Kentucky's complicity
statute. 7 The trial court held that Mary Knox had a legal duty to take action
to protect her child and "to make an effort to prevent the commission of the
rape."' In reversing the complicity conviction of Mary Knox, the Kentucky
Supreme Court found that neither statutory nor common law imposed a
legal duty upon her to prevent the rape of her daughter: "We know of no
higher moral duty than that of preventing such a crime, and, indeed, a
failure to do so is most 'reprehensible.' However, 'a moral duty to take
affirmative action is not enough to impose a legal duty to do so.' "29
The Commonwealth in Knox urged the court to find a duty under the
Kentucky statutes addressing child abuse,30 "particularly KRS 199.335."'
The Commonwealth argued that this provision, which was the reporting
statute at that time, imposed a legal duty to stop abuse." The reporting
statute required "[a]ny physician, osteopathic physician, nurse, teacher,
school personnel .... social worker, coroner, medical examiner, child
caringpersonnel, resident, intern, chiropractor, dentist, optometrist, health
professional, peace officer, mental health professional or other person" to
report suspected abuse or neglect of a child.33 The Commonwealth further
asserted that sections 508.100 through 508.120, 530.040, and 530.050
placed a legal duty on Mary Knox to prevent the rape of her daughter by
her husband.34 Sections 508.100 through 508.120, the criminal abuse
statutes, 35 impose criminal liability on someone who abuses or allows the
abuse of a person of whom he or she has custody.36 However, as the Knox
court noted, the criminal abuse statutes were not applicable to the case
26 id.
27 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21 Knox, 735 S.W.2d at 711.
29 Id. at 712 (citations omitted) (quoting Elmendorf v. Commonwealth, 188
S.W. 483, 489 (Ky. 1916)); see also 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE




13 Law of 1976, ch. 142, § 2, 1976 Acts of the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 334-35 (repealed 1986).
34 See Knox, 735 S.W.2d at 712.
3 See id. at 713.
36 See K.R.S. §§ 508.100-.120 (Michie 1990).
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because they became effective after the offenses occurred.37 Under sections
530.040 and 530.050, a parent is criminally liable for deserting his or her
child "in any place under circumstances endangering his life or health and
with intent to abandon him [or her]" 38 and for failing to provide support for
his or her child,39 respectively. The Knox court found that these statutes and
the reporting statute "fall far short of the legal duty the Commonwealth
seeks to impose."'
Foreshadowing his plurality opinion in Lane v. Commonwealth,4
Justice Wintersheimer maintained, in his dissent, that several Kentucky
statutes imposed a legal duty on Mary Knox to prevent the rape of her child
by her husband.42 The dissent pointed to the reporting statute, section
199.335(2), which provided that all persons, implicitly including parents,
have a duty to report child abuse.43 Justice Wintersheimer further noted that
section 199.335 had been repealed, effective July 1, 1987, and replaced by
Chapter 620, the section on dependency, neglect, and abuse.' The
legislative purpose of Chapter 620 is described in section 620.010, which
states that "[c]hildren have certain fimdamental rights which must be
protected and preserved, including... the right to be free from physical,
sexual or emotional injury or exploitation."45 Looking at the recently
repealed reporting statute and the new section on dependency, neglect, and
abuse, the dissent stated, "It is absolutely illogical to legislate a duty to
report and prevent child abuse for many other named professions who are
in 'loco parentis' and hold in this opinion that the parent has no duty
whatsoever to prevent abuse. It defies common sense." '46 In arguing that a
legal duty should be imposed on Mary Knox, Justice Wintersheimer also
referred to the criminal abuse statutes, sections 508.100 through 508.120,
37 SeeKnox, 735 S.W.2d at 712.
38 K.R.S. § 530.040.
39 See id. § 530.050.
40 Knox, 735 S.W.2d at 712.
41 Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1067 (1998).
42 See Knox, 735 S.W.2d at 712 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
43 See id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 713 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). According to K.R.S. Chapter
620, dependency occurs when "any child, other than an abused or neglected child
... is under improper care, custody, control, or guardianship that is not due to an
intentional act of the parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or
supervision of the child." K.R.S. § 600.020(13) (Michie Supp. 1996).
41 K.R.S. § 620.010 (Michie 1990).
41 Knox, 735 S.W.2d at 713 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
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which make it a criminal offense for a person to allow another person of
whom he or she has custody to be abused.47 The dissent asserted, "There is
no call for a parent to be a hero but only to take reasonable measures to
prevent the abuse of their [sic] child.' 418 The dissent further noted that the
Kentucky courts have found that "any person neglecting to discharge his
duty by withholding food or clothing or medical care for a child can be
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter."'49 Justice Wintersheimer
concluded that Mary Knox's conviction for complicity to commit first
degree rape should have been affirmed. 0
II. THE IMPOSITION OF A LEGAL DUTY:
LANE V COMMONWEALTH
A. The Facts of Lane
In Lane v. Commonwealth,51 the state charged Kimberly Lane with
complicity to commit assault in the first degree and charged her boyfriend,
Bryan Tubbs, with assault in the first degree for injuries sustained by
Lane's two-year-old daughter, Tiffany." The indictment read that Lane
"'aided, counseled, or attempted to aid Bryan Tubbs in the offense of
assault in the first degree when he intentionally caused serious physical
injury to the child' with a dangerous instrument, manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life."53
The Commonwealth offered evidence that Lane had started a newjob
and left Tiffany with Tubbs. When she returned home from work, Lane
found Tiffany injured and took her to the hospital.54 The "child's skull and
" See id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). The dissent considered the criminal
abuse statutes even though, as the majority opinion made clear, they were
inapplicable to the Knox case because they were not in effect at the time the
offenses were committed.
48Id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
4 Id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (citing Westrup v. Commonwealth, 93
S.W. 646 (Ky. 1906), JAMES M. ROBERSON, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 204 (1899)).
See Knox, 735 S.W.2d at 713 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
stLane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1067 (1998).
12 See id. at 874.
5 1 Id. (quoting indictment).
14 See Brief for Appellant at 4, Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998) (No. 95-SC-941-D).
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arm were fractured."'55 Lane and Tubbs claimed that the child sustained the
injuries when she fell down a flight of stairs.56 At trial, three doctors who
had treated Tiffany at an emergency room and at a Louisville hospital
testified that the injuries, which included the skull and arm fractures as well
as bruises, abrasions, and contusions, were inconsistent with such a fall.57
The injuries were linear in nature and appeared to be the result of the child
being struck with a linear object." The doctors further testified that the.
injuries were inflicted, not accidental.59 According to Barren County
Commonwealth Attorney Phillip Patton, Tubbs had repeatedly beaten
Tiffany with his fists and a coat hanger.6"
The jury found Lane guilty of complicity to commit assault in the first
degree and Tubbs guilty of assault in the first degree.61 The trial judge set
aside Lane's complicity conviction,62 relying on Knox v. Commonwealth63
in finding that Lane did not have a legal duty to avert her boyfriend's abuse
of her daughter."r
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reinstated Lane's complicity
conviction and held that "'parents have an "affirmative duty" to prevent
crimes against their children and are not just morally bound.'- 65 The
Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine
"whether the trial judge committed reversible error when he found that
there was no legal duty imposed on [Lane] to prevent the abuse of her
child. ' 66 The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
reinstated Lane's conviction.67 The plurality opinion, written by Justice
5 Charles Wolfe, High Court Ponders Duty of Mother to Protect Child, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 24, 1997, at B3.56 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875.
57 See id. at 874-75.
58 "Linear" means "pertaining to or resembling a line." THOMAS LATHROP
STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 882 (25th ed. 1990). This
description is consistent with the Barren County Commonwealth Attorney's claim
that Tiffany had been beaten with a coat hanger. See Wolfe, supra note 55, at B3.
51 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875.
60 See Wolfe, supra note 55, at B3.
61 See id.; see also Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 874.
62 See Wolfe, supra note 55, at B3; see also Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 874.
" Knox v. Commonwealth, 735 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1987), overruled by Lane v.
Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
4 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875.65 Wolfe, supra note 55, at B3 (quoting unpublished court of appeals opinion).
66 Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875.
67See id. at 876.
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Wintersheimer and joined by Justices Graves and Lambert, found that a
legal duty was imposed by Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.68
According to Justice Cooper's concurring opinion, in which Justice
Johnstone joined, a parent's legal duty to protect a child from abuse arises
from the common law and the statutory recognition of a "special
relationship" between parent and child.69 The dissent, written by Justice
Stumbo and joined by Chief Justice Stephefts, reasserted the position taken
in Knox70 that a parent does not have a legal duty to prevent the abuse of his
or her child.7
B. The Plurality: A Statutory Duty
Lane was convicted under the complicity statute, section 502.020.72
Subsection (1) of this statute provides that "[a] person is guilty of an
offense committed by another" when that person has a "legal duty to
prevent the commission of the offense" and does not do so.' The plurality
held that the trial judge erred in setting aside the complicity conviction of
Lane and that the Kentucky statutes impose a legal duty on a parent to
prevent the abuse of his or her child.'
Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes addresses dependency,
neglect, and abuse. In 1986, this chapter replaced section 199.335, which
was the law in effect at the time of the offenses in the Knox case.75 In
setting forth the legislative purpose of the chapter, section 620.010
provides that "[c]hildren have certain fundamental rights which must be
protected and preserved, including... the right to be free from physical,
sexual or emotional injury or exploitation."'76 Section 620.030 imposes a
duty to report on any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe
that a child is dependent, neglected, or abused.
77
6 See id.
69 See id. at 880-81 (Cooper, J., concurring).
70 See Knox v. Commonwealth, 735 S.W.2d 711,712 (Ky. 1987), overruled by
Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067
(1998).
71 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 882-83 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
72 See id. at 874.
73 K.R.S. § 502.020(1)(c) (Michie 1990).
74 See Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
75 See id. at 875.
76 K.R.S. § 620.010.
77See id. § 620.030.
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Section 405.020 provides that parents shall "nurture" their children
under the age of eighteen.78 While this statute was not a basis for the
court's decision, the plurality "observe[d] that a secondary meaning to the
commonly understood 'nurture' means the act of taking care of children
and certainly does not involve the tolerance ofphysical injury." 9 The court
also referred to the criminal abuse statutes, sections 508.100 through
508.120, but did not hold that an affirmative duty to prevent child abuse
arises from those statutes.8" The criminal abuse statutes provide criminal
liability for abusing a child or for permitting a child of whom he or she has
custody to be abused.8
The plurality held that in light of the legislative intent of Chapter 620,
"K.R.S. § 620.010 creates an affirmative duty for the parent of a child to
prevent such physical injury which would result in an assault on that child,"
a duty Lane violated.8 2 In finding that Lane had a legal duty to prevent her
boyfriend's assault on her child, the court overruled Knox, 3 and in doing
so, the court attempted to explain its change in reasoning since the Knox
decision. Section 199.335, the law in effect at the time of the Knox
offenses, was repealed and replaced by Chapter 620.84 The court noted that
there is "little if any significant difference"85 between section 199.335 and
the new section on dependency, neglect, and abuse, except that Chapter 620
imposes a legal duty to prevent physical injury to children:
86
In view of the natural relationship between parent and guardian, KRS
620.010 creates an affirmative duty for parents and guardians to prevent
physical injury which results in an assault on the child.... It must be
remembered that conduct based on the failure to act where there is a legal
duty to act is still punishable pursuant to KRS 502.020(1)(c). The
78See id. § 405.020(1) (Michie 1996).
79Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875.
80 See id.
s' See K.R.S. §§ 508.100-.120 (Michie 1990).
82Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875.
83 See id. at 876.
84 See id. at 875.
85 Id.
86,"Wintersheimer says there is little difference between the old and new statute,
yet this makes a big difference in the law." Telephone Interview with Karen Shuff




legislature has clearly expressed their intent to punish those who through
passive conduct allow physical injury to children 7
The court also held that prosecution for failing to prevent child abuse
where there is a legal duty to do so can fall under the assault statutes 8 or
the abuse statutes.89 Criminal abuse is not a lesser-included offense of
assault; criminal abuse and assault are parallel crimes.9° The prosecutor can
choose to charge the passive parent with assault or abuse.91
C. The Concurrence: The "Special Relationship"
The concurring justices agreed with the plurality that Kimberly Lane
had a legal duty to protect her two-year-old daughter Tiffany from abuse
by her boyfriend Bryan Tubbs, but differed with the plurality regarding the
origin of this duty. While the plurality found an affirmative duty to act to
prevent the abuse of a child was placed upon a parent by Chapter 620 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, the concurring justices stated that this duty
arises from the "special relationship" between a custodial parent and his or
her child92 that is recognized by the common law and by the Kentucky
nurturing and criminal statutes. 93
1. Rejection of the Statutory Duty
The concurrence rejected the plurality's position that a legal duty to
prevent abuse emanates from the language of Chapter 620.94 The statute
recognizes that a child may have to be removed from his or her parents95
in order to achieve the statute's stated purpose of protecting and preserving
children's "fundamental right[ ] ... to be free from... injury or exploita-
87Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 876.
88 See K.R.S. §§ 620.010, .030 (Michie 1990).
89See id. §§ 508.100-.120
90SeeLane, 956 S.W.2d at 876 (citing Commonwealth v. Chandler, 722 S.W.2d
899, 900-01 (Ky. 1987)).
9' See id.
92 See id. at 876-77 (Cooper, J., concurring). The "special relationship" theory
was not raised by the parties in their briefs or in oral arguments. Interview with
Karen ShuffMaurer, supra note 86.
9 See K.R.S. §§ 405.020, 508.100-.120.
94 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 876 (Cooper, J., concurring).
11 See K.R.S. § 620.010.
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tion."96 As the concurrence noted, "the purpose of this statute is not to
establish a new and unique parental duty to protect a child from forces
outside the parent-child relationship, but to establish the basis for removing
a neglected or abused child from the custody of his abusive parents. 97
The plurality also relied on the reporting statute, section 620.030, to
find a legal duty.98 The concurring opinion pointed out that subsection (2)
of that statute specifies almost twenty groups of persons that have a duty
to report known or suspected abuse;99 however, "parents" are not expressly
mentioned. Parents would merely fall under the catch-all phrase "'all
persons."" 00 The concurrence stated, "Clearly, this statute is designed to
protect a child not so much from outside forces, as from abuse or neglect
perpetrated, as here, by someone within the child's own family environ-
ment.' 101
The concurrence also criticized the plurality for subjecting the state's
professionals to complicity liability by basing a legal duty to prevent abuse
on the reporting statute.10 Since a legal duty to prevent child abuse comes
from the reporting statute, those persons named in the statute, including
doctors, social workers, teachers, and others, who fail to report known or
suspected child abuse could be charged as an accomplice to that abuse.
Such wide-sweeping criminal liability is hardly what the legislature
intended in enacting the reporting statute. 103
96 Id.
97 Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 877 (Cooper, J., concurring).
98 See id. at 876.
99 See id. at 877 (Cooper, J., concurring); see also K.R.S. § 620.030(2). The
reporting statute places a duty to report abuse on:
Any person, including but not limited to a physician, osteopathic physician,
nurse, teacher, school personnel, social worker, coroner, medical examiner,
child-caring personnel, resident, intern, chiropractor, dentist, optometrist,
emergency medical technician, paramedic, health professional, mental
health professional, peace officer or any organization or agency for any of
the above, who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is
dependent, neglected or abused, regardless of whether the person believed
to have caused the dependency, neglect or abuse is a parent, guardian,
person exercising custodial control orsupervision oranotherperson, orwho
has attended such child as a part of his professional duties ....
Id.
0 Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 877 (Cooper, J., concurring) (quoting K.R.S. §
620.030(2)).
101 Id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
2See id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
'o
3 See id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
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2. Civil Liability and the "Special Relationship"
The concurrence in Lane further stated that the legal duty a parent has
to prevent the abuse of his or her child emanates from the "'special
relationship'" found "between any custodian and the person in his [or her]
custody."'' The Kentucky courts in imposing civil liability have identified
a "special relationship" between the state and a person in the state's
custody. 05 This "special relationship" creates a duty for the state to protect
those in its custody.
The Kentucky cases'016 recognizing the "special relationship" between
the state and someone in the state's custody rely on DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services."0 7 In DeShaney, the
Department of Social Services received reports that Joshua DeShaney was
being abused by his father, Randy DeShaney, but did not remove the child
from his father's custody. 0 8 At the age of four years, Joshua fell into a
coma after being severely beaten by his father. Joshua suffered brain
damage, and his father was convicted of child abuse. 9 Joshua and his
mother brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983110 against the social
services department."'
Rejecting the argument that a "special relationship" existed between
the state and Joshua, the United States Supreme Court held that the state
did not owe a duty to Joshua. 2 When the state takes a person into its
custody and that person is no longer able to care for himself or herself, the
" Id. (Cooper, J., concurring) (quoting Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908,
910 (Ky. 1995); Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Ky. Ct. App.
1992)).
"05 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 877 (Cooper, J., concurring) (citing Fryman v.
Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1995); Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d
184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)).
'06 Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1995), and Ashby v. City of
Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), did not involve child abuse but
used the "special relationship" test set forth in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
"7 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
'o' See id. at 192-93.
109 See id. at 193.
110 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) (providing a civil cause of action for
the deprivation of constitutional rights).
.. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93.
112 See id. at 203.
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United States Constitution"13 requires the state to provide for that person's
needs and assume responsibility for that person's safety and well-being. " 4
"[This] affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge
of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on
his own behalf."'" 5 The Supreme Court held that the state did not have a
constitutional duty to protect Joshua, because Joshua was injured while in
the custody of his father, not the state. Although the state may have known
about the abuse of Joshua, the state did not cause the situation nor did the
state make Joshua more susceptible to the abuse.
16
The concurring opinion in Lane pointed out that the United States
Supreme Court has held that a state has a legal duty to protect a person who
has been involuntarily institutionalized." 7 In addition, several federal
courts of appeals have held that a state may be liable under the Due Process
Clause' 8 if a foster child is abused by his or her foster parents." 9 Further,
some state courts have recognized a "special relationship" between a state
and a person in its custody. From this "special relationship" comes the
state's duty to prevent harm to those in its custody.2 0
An affirmative duty to act arising from a "special relationship" has
been found in relationships that do not include a governmental body. 2' For
example, the Missouri court of appeals, in Reed v. Hercules Construction
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause).
"4 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
115 Id.
16 See id. at 201.
117 See Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 877-78 (Ky. 1997) (Cooper,
J., concurring) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U:S. 307 (1982)), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998). "When aperson is institutionalized- and wholly dependent
on the State -.. . a duty to provide certain services and care does exist ......
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"I See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 878 (Cooper, J., concurring) (citing Doe v. New
York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1981); Taylor ex rel.
Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,794-97 (1 th Cir. 1987)).
"2' See id. (Cooper, J., concurring) (citing Sanders v. City of Belle Glade, 510
So. 2d 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). The concurring opinion also cites to Jean
v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993); however, the explanatory
parenthetical after that citation describes another Massachusetts case to which the
Jean case refers, A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1988). See Jean,
610 N.E.2d at 309-10.
121 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 878.
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Co.," recognized that the "duty to protect against the intentional criminal
conduct of a third person . . . arises only where there is a 'special
relationship.' ,,a The Reed court further stated that "[a] 'special relation-
ship' exists when one entrusts himself to the protection of another and
reasonably relies on the other to provide a place of safety," such as when
a guest relies on an innkeeper. 24 The duty arising from a "special
relationship" has also been described in the following terms:
"[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such aposition
with regard to another... that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in
his own conduct... he would cause danger of injury to the person or
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid
such danger."'
25
3. The "Special Relationship" in
the Criminal Context: Persuasive Authority
After examining the recognition of a legal duty arising from a "special
relationship" in the civil context, the concurring opinion in Lane then
turned to the issue of whether criminal liability can be based on a violation
of such a duty.2 6 The concurrence quoted a noted criminal law treatise:
"[O]ne has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when
that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself."..
.The common law imposes affirmative duties upon persons standing in
certain personal relationships to other persons - upon parents to aidsmall
children, upon husbands to aid their wives, upon ship captains to aid their
crews, upon masters to aid their servants. Thus a parent may be guilty of
criminal homicide for failure to call a doctor for his sick child, a mother
forfailure to prevent thefatal beating ofher baby by her lover, a husband
for failure to aid his imperiled wife, a ship captain for failure to pick up
a seaman or passenger fallen overboard, and an employer for failure to aid
Reed v. Hercules Constr. Co., 693 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
'
23 Id. at 282.
124 .1d.
" Tamsoffv. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334,342 (Cal.
1976) (quoting Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883)).
116 See Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Ky. 1997) (Cooper, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
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his endangered employee. Action may be required to ... [protect against]
threatened acts by third persons.1
27
The concurring opinion then proceeded to review the decisions of other
states that have recognized a legal duty ofa parent arising from the "special
relationship" between parent and child.128 The first case to find a duty
imposed on a parent to prevent the abuse of his or her child was Palmer v.
State.'29 The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a mother's conviction for
involuntary manslaughter. 3 Although Palmer had not abused her twenty-
month-old daughter Terry, she did nothing to stop the severe and violent
beatings her boyfriend, Edward P. McCue, inflicted on the baby, which
resulted in the child's death.' The court found that under the Maryland
nurturing statute, Palmer was responsible for the "'support, care, nurture,
welfare and education"' of her child.3 2 This statute created a legal duty
requiring Palmer to provide for her daughter's welfare and care. The court
held that "where the defendant owed to a deceased person a specific legal
duty, but failed to perform the same, and death resulted to the deceased
because of the nonperformance of the duty, ... the defendant is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter."'33 The Palmer court found that the duty created
by the nurturing statute was "not a perfunctory one, to be performed only
at the voluntary pleasure or whimsical desire of the parent."' 34 Maintaining
that Palmer had acted with "'a wanton or reckless disregard for human
life,' the court stated that her behavior "in permitting and, in fact,
compelling this poor little defenseless urchin to remain in an environment
where she was subjected to merciless, inhumane and inordinate brutality
of a protracted nature, manifested a recklessness of justice and the rights
and feelings of the tiny infant" and was "outrageous.'
1 35
In North Carolina v. Walden, 36 the court addressed the issue of
"whether a mother may be found guilty of assault on a theory of aiding and
'27 Id. (quoting 1 LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 28, § 3.3, at 284-85).
" See id. at 878-79 (Cooper, J., concurring).
129 Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960).
'30 See id. at 474.
31 See id. at 468-72.
132 Id. at 468 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1957)) (alteration in
original).
'33 Id. at 468-69.
'34 Id. at 473.
131 Id. (quoting Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684, 688 (1959)).
136North Carolina v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982).
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abetting solely on the basis that she was present when her child was
assaulted but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the assault."'37 In
this case, Aleen Estes Walden was found guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon and inflicting serious bodily injury upon her son Lamont. 3 1 After
a neighbor reported that he heard a child's screams and a "popping sound"
for one to one-and-one-half hours coming from the Walden apartment, a
police officer arrived and found Walden's five small children with cuts and
bruises on their bodies. '39 One of the children, Lamont, was in diapers and
had red marks on his chests, a swollen lip, and bruises on his legs and back.
At trial, three of Walden's children testified that "Bishop" George Hoskins
had beaten one-year-old Lamont with a belt and that their mother had been
in the same room while the beating occurred and did not do or say anything
to stop the beating of her young son. 40
The Walden court found that the common law had recognized
affirmative duties to act arising out of a relationship, such as the one
between a parent and child, and that a person could be held criminally
liable for failing to act where such a duty is present.14' The court also
pointed out that the state, through statutory and case law, imposes on
parents a legal duty to protect and provide for their children. 42 In deciding
that Walden could be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon because
she was present at her son's beating and took no action to prevent it, the
court held that requiring a parent to take action to prevent the abuse of his
or her child "imposes a reasonable duty upon the parent."'4 3 Adopting
passive parent liability, the Walden court stated: "We believe this duty is
and has always been inherent in the duty of parents to provide for the safety
and welfare of their children, which duty has long been recognized by the
common law and by statute."'" Parents are not required to put themselves
in danger, "[b]ut parents do have the duty to take every step reasonably




37 Id. at 782.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 782.
140 See id. at 783.
141 See id. at 785.
142 See id.
'





In Michael v. Alaska," a father was held criminally liable for his
wife's abuse of their daughter.'47 Steven and Loreli Michael brought their
two-month-old daughter to the hospital because of her red and swollen leg.
X-rays showed that the infant had many broken bones in different stages
of recovery. 48 The upper and lower bones of both arms and both legs and
at least nine ribs were fractured. 149 The Michaels were each charged with
thirteen counts of assault in the first degree.150
The trial judge found Steven Michael guilty of two counts of second-
degree assault and held that Michael had a statutory and common law duty
under Alaska law to "'aid and assist his child if she was under the threat or
risk of physical damage or assault - from any person, including his
wife.' " The judge also found that Steven Michael failed to act when his
wife abused their daughter, and that this was a knowing failure.152 In
affirming the father's conviction, the Alaska Court of Appeals stated that
under the common law a person has no duty to help another, but that an
exception to this general rule has been carved out when dealing with a
parent-child relationship.' The court also noted the trend of recognizing
a parent's legal duty to protect his or her child and of imposing criminal
liability where a parent fails to prevent the abuse of his or her child. I4 The
court looked to Alaska's statutory law to find a legal duty to protect.1
51
Under one provision, a parent can be charged with a misdemeanor for
falling to provide support for a child.5 6 Pursuant to another Alaska statute,
a person commits a criminal offense if he or she has custody of a child aged
ten or younger, and then "intentionally deserts the child in any place under
circumstances creating a substantial risk of physical injury to the child."'
157
Based on these statutes and the common law, the Alaska Court of Appeals
146 Michael v. Alaska, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1991).
147 See id. at 203.
14 See id. at 196.
149 See id.
See id. at 195.
'Id. at 197 (quoting the trial court).
152 See id.
1-1 See id. at 198-99.
'-
4 See id. (citing State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982), Palmer v. State,
164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960), and other cases where a passive parent has been held
criminally liable for failing to prevent the abuse of his or her child).
' See id. at 198.
'




found that Steven Michael had a duty to protect his daughter from his
wife's abuse andthat he couldbe criminally liable for violating this duty.'58
Similarly, in P.S. v. State,'59 a mother was convicted of "willful abuse,
cruel beating or otherwise willful maltreatment of a child under the age of
[eighteen]" when she failed to "protect the child from physical assault by
a third party."'' The evidence at trial demonstrated that the mother's live-
in boyfriend abused her two-year-old daughter.1 61 Asserting that her duty
to protect her daughter would arise only if she knew of the abuse, the
mother claimed she was not aware that her boyfriend was harming her
child. 62 In affirming the mother's conviction, the court identified knowl-
edge as an element of the crime and held that "there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could lawfully infer that the appellant knew
that her child was being abused by [the boyfriend], and she was also trying
to conceal this fact from others. 163
In People v. Peters," Barbara Peters was convicted of the murder of
her twenty-month-old son Bobby, based on a theory of accountability.
1 65
Bobby died from "bilateral subdural hematomas which resulted from blunt
head trauma" inflicted by Barbara Peters' boyfriend, Kenneth Jacobsen.1
66
The Peters court noted the parent-child exception to the general common
law no-duty rule, 67 and held that a "parent who knowingly fails to protect
its child from abuse may be prosecuted under theaccountability statute
and, thereby, become[s] legally accountable for the conduct of the
abuser."' 68 Intent is a requirement of the accountability statute and can be
15 See Michael, 767 P.2d at 198-99.
15' P.S. v. State, 565 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
160 See id. at 1210.
161 See id. at 1210-11.
'62 See id. at 1211.
1631Id. at 1212.
" People v. Peters, 586 N.E.2d 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), afl'dsub nom. People
v. Staciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. 1992).
161 See id. at 470. Peters was also convicted of battery, cruelty to a child, and
endangerment. See id.
166 id.
167 See id. at 476.
168 Id. The accountability statute provides, in relevant part:
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent
to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or
attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
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inferred from knowledge. 69 The court found that Peters intended to
facilitate the abuse of her child because she knew that her child was in a
dangerous situation and failed to remove Bobby from this abusive
environment. 70 The court stated: "The defendant aided Jacobsen, who
continued to abuse and, ultimately murder her son by failing to protect him
during the many occasions when it was reasonably possible for her to do
so.'' The court found that the intent element was satisfied even though
Peters was not present when her boyfriend inflicted the fatal beating."
After reviewing these cases imposing a duty on the passive parent to
prevent abuse, the concurring opinion in Lane stated:
[N]o conceptual distinction is perceived between imposing a legal
duty upon the state to protect a person in its custody from harm and
imposing the same legal duty upon a custodial parent to protect a child in
his custody from harm inflicted by a person whom the parent has invited
into the custodial environment. 73
While the Knox court had rejected the argument that a common law duty
was imposed on parents to protect their children from harm, the Lane
concurrence found that such a duty does exist, and that it arises from "the
common law concept of the 'special relationship' which exists between a
custodian and the person in his custody."" 4 The concurrence noted that this
relationship had only been recognized in Kentucky after the court's
decision in Knox v. Commonwealth.175
4. Kentucky Statutes and the "Special Relationship"
The concurring opinion in Lane asserted that Kentucky statutory law
also recognizes a parent's duty to prevent the abuse of his or her child and
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (West 1993).
16 9 See Peters, 586 N.E.2d at 476.
170 See id.
171 Id.
72 See id. at 477.
'71 Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Ky. 1997) (Cooper, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
'
74 Id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
'"See id. (Cooper, J., concurring). Two Kentucky civil cases, decided after
Knox, that recognized the common law "special relationship" concept were Fryman
v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1995), and Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841
S.W.2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
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that this duty arises from the "special relationship" concept. 7 6 Under
section 405.020, parents are responsible for"thejoint custody, nurture, and
education oftheir children."'77 The Lane concurrence statedthat "[n]urture"
is defined as "to care for" and that "it requires no leap in logic to equate
care with protection."'78
The concurrence also looked to the "penal statutes which criminalize
certain conduct of parents directed toward their children" in order to find
legislative identification of the "special relationship" concept. 79 Under
section 530.040, a parent can be charged with a Class D felony if the parent
deserts his or her child "under circumstances endangering [the child's] life
or health... with the intent to abandon."'180 Section 530.060 provides that
it is a Class A misdemeanor for a person who has custody of a child to fail
or refuse "to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to
prevent him from becoming a neglected, dependent or delinquent child."''
The criminal abuse statutes, sections 508.100 through 508.120, make it a
crime for a person to abuse or allow the abuse of a child of whom he or she
has custody. 8 2 According to the concurrence, these statutes demonstrate
legislative recognition of the "special relationship" between a parent and
child.'83 This relationship imposes an affirmative duty on a parent to
prevent the abuse of his or her child according to the mandate of the
complicity statute.
184
The concurring opinion in Lane pointed out the difference between the
two sections of the complicity statute. Section 502.020(1) refers to
"complicity as to the criminal act," such as "the assault of the child," while
section 502.020(2) pertains to "complicity as to the criminal result," or
consequence of the assault. 8 To charge and convict under section
502.020(2), the prosecution is not required to prove intent.'86 The passive
parent can also be convicted under section 502.020(2) if that parent acted
"wantonly or recklessly with respect to a risk that harm will occur to the
176 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 880-81 (Cooper, J., concurring).
177 See K.R.S. § 405.020 (Michie Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
178 Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 881 (Cooper, J., concurring).
'
79 Id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
'80 K.R.S. § 530.040 (Michie 1990).
's' Id. § 530.060.
'
8 2 See id. §§ 508.100-.120.
See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 881 (Cooper, J., concurring).
184See id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
s Id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
'
86 See id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
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child and fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent it.' 81 7 A parent who
witnesses the abuse of his or her child and "fails to make a reasonable
effort" to prevent the abuse can be convicted under section 502.020(1),
because such passive conduct can imply "actual intent to promote or
facilitate the offense."' 88
D. The Dissent: "Legislating when We Should Be Adjudicating"8 9
The dissenting justices in Lane criticized the court's change of opinion
from its position in Knox: "[T]he Court has twisted the words of the
legislature and reshaped them into a form to its liking, in order to impose
a legal duty that did not previously exist."'90 They believed the Common-
wealth should have charged Kimberly Lane with criminal abuse in the first
degree rather than complicity to commit first-degree assault and that the
only reason for the complicity charge was disapproval of the lighter penalty
for criminal abuse.' 91
Both the dissent and concurrence were critical of the plurality
opinion." The plurality found a legal duty of a parent to act imposed by
Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. 193 The reporting statute, one
of the statutes from which this duty arises, requires "[a]ny person,"
including those specifically named in the statute, to report known or
suspected child abuse. 4 Justice Stumbo noted that the statute imposes a
duty to report abuse, not a duty to prevent harm to children,'95 and pointed
out that basing a legal duty on the reporting statute subjects the professions
specified in the statute to a risk of criminal liability, which surely was not
the intent of the legislature.9 6 In addition, she relied on the precedent of
Knox, in which the court refused to find a legal duty to prevent abuse
imposed by statutory language.' 97
The dissenting justices also disagreed with the concurring opinion's
interpretation of the "special relationship" concept. They asserted that the
'
87 Id. at 882 (Cooper, J., concurring).
'
88 Id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
89 .d at 883 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
'
90 Id. at 882 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
'9' See id. (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
'
92 See id. at 876 (Cooper, J., concurring); id. at 882 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
193 See id. at 876.
'94K.R.S. § 620.030(2) (Michie 1990).
9 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 882 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
See id. at 883 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
See id. at 882 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
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Kentucky cases to which the concurrence referred 98 did not concern child
abuse or a parent-child relationship, but rather "were limited to the
foreseeable injury to a person by a person under the control of the state." '199
They refused to interpret the cases that broadly:
The leap from the imposition of civil liability on the state for failure
to prevent a foreseeable injury by one under its custody or control ... to
criminal sanction for the failure to perform a legal duty that must be
deduced from the interpretation of three civil cases is one [we would] not
make.
200
The dissent also pointed out that the Kentucky legislature, not the Kentucky
Supreme Court, is responsible for setting forth and defining a legal duty.2",
The dissent concluded:
With these opinions, we are putting the overburdened educators and
medical personnel who have daily contact with our children at risk of
criminal charges arising from things that perhaps should have been
noticed, but in the course of hectic schedules, were not. The actions of this
defendant were morally reprehensible and repugnant to any responsible,
empathetic person, but it is the legislature that defines what behavior
constitutes criminal conduct and sets forth the mechanism ofpunishment,
not the judiciary. Here, we are, in effect, legislating when we should be
adjudicating. 2
III. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF LANE
A. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Imposing Criminal Liability for
Failure to Protect
When a state decides to impose criminal sanctions for an act, it is
promoting a specific policy or set of goals.2°s As one commentator has
noted, "[t]he underlying rationales in holding people criminally liable for
'
98 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
199 Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 882 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 883 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
201 See id. (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
'
02 Id. (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
203 See generally Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to
Protect, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 359 (1987).
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their actions are punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation."2' ° Many feel
that child abuse is a horrible, inexcusable crime and that someone who
allows his or her child to be abused should be punished. 05 If a mother
knows the consequences for failing to protect her child, she might be
compelled to remove her child from an abusive situation.2 6 Additionally,
through the criminal justice system, the passive parent may have access to
counseling to improve his or her parenting skills. 07
One drawback to imposing criminal liability for passive child abuse is
that "the [passive parent's] obligation to remove [his or] her children from
the [abusive parent's] control will at the very least disrupt any remaining
shreds of family harmony and, very likely, will precipitate the dissolution
of the family unit."0 8 If both parents are put in jail, this "may punish the
children and destabilize their environment," and "[w]hile the children are
doubtless safer without the abusive [parent], it is less clear that they are
better off in foster care than in a single-parent home with their [passive
parent]."20 9
Yet another drawback is complicity liability's disproportionate impact
on women. '° Throughout the concurring opinion in Lane, Justice Cooper
used male pronouns to refer to the passive parent."1' This language creates
an inaccurate picture, because the passive parent is usually the mother.212
Men are more likely to be the abuser and "women often cannot protect
themselves or their children from a male partner's abuse."213 When the
104 Id. at 376.
205 See id.
206 See Nancy A. Tanck, Note, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal
LiabilityforParents Who Fail to Protect Their Childrenfrom Abuse, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 659, 684 (1987).
207 See id.
208 Id. at 684-85.
209 Id. at 685.
210 Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social
Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 15 (1995) ("There is a profound tendency in our culture to
blame mothers (not fathers) for all problems children face (and all problem
children).").
211 SeeLane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 876-82 (Ky. 1997) (Cooper,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
212 See Linda J. Panko, LegalBacklash: The ExpandingLiability of Women Who
Fail to Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner's Abuse, 6 HASTINGS




mother finds herself and her children in an abusive situation, "it is
extremely unfair to subject her to criminal liability when she had no
meaningful alternative to inaction. ' 214 Reasons women fail to protect their
children include: "(1) fear of retaliation by the abuser; (2) economic
dependence on the male abuser; (3) emotional dependence on the male
abuser, including the phenomenon of 'learned helplessness;' and (4) family
or legal pressure, such as fear that children will be taken from them."2 5
B. Criminal Abuse, Not Complicity Liability
The Lane dissent suggested that the Commonwealth made a mistake in
prosecuting this as a complicity case and that Lane should have been
charged with criminal abuse in the first degree.2 6 Assuming the existence
of a legal duty, the elements of complicity to commit assault in the first
degree and the elements of criminal abuse in the first degree are
identical.2"7 The sole reason for the complicity charge was "dissatisfaction"
with the lighter penalty for criminal abuse.218
In enacting the criminal abuse statutes, sections 508.100 through
508.120, the legislature explicitly made it a criminal offense for a person
to permit a child in his or her custody to be abused.2 19 These statutes
demonstrate the legislature's intent to penalize the passive parent's conduct
under the criminal abuse statutes. By punishing a parent under the
complicity statute for failing to protect his or her child, the Lane plurality
and concurrence ignore the legislature's intent and infringe upon the
legislature's role in defining criminal conduct.
Holding that an affirmative duty to prevent abuse of children arises
from Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the Lane plurality
stated that a prosecutor can choose to charge the passive parent under
assault or abuse?220 As a result, two parents who fail to protect their children
from abuse may receive two very different sentences. Assault in the first
214 Tanck, supra note 206, at 685.
21
1 Panko, supra note 212, at 68-69.
21
1 See Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Ky. 1997) (Stumbo, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
217 See id.
218 Id.
219 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 508.100 (Michie 1990) ("A person is guilty of criminal
abuse in the first degree when he... permits another person of whom he has actual
custody to be abused .... ."); see also supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.220See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 876.
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degree is a Class B felony,"2 which carries a maximum sentence of twenty
years and a minimum sentence often years. 2 Criminal abuse in the first
degree is a Class C felony.' The maximum time a person can be sentenced
to prison for criminal abuse in the first degree is ten years, and the
minimum is five years?24 One prosecutor may choose to charge a passive
parent with criminal abuse in the first degree, and that parent may receive
a five-year sentence. Another prosecutor may choose to prosecute a passive
parent under the complicity statute, as the prosecutor did in the Lane
case,= and that parent may be sentenced to prison for ten years. Accord-
ingly, the Lane decision will lead to inconsistent sentences for identical
conduct.
C. The Expansion of Complicity Liability
Both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lane criticized the
plurality opinion for finding a legal duty of a parent to protect his or her
child from harm arising from Kentucky's reporting statute. 6 By basing an
affirmative duty to prevent child abuse on the reporting statute, those
specifically named in the statute - doctors, teachers, social workers, and
others - are placed in jeopardy of complicity liability.
The concern of the concurrence and dissent is not unrealistic. Civil
liability has been imposed on public authorities for failing to remove
abused or neglected children from their parents' custody. 7 In 1995, ajury
in Wayne County, Kentucky, acquitted three state social workers and their
supervisor of complicity to commit murder. 8 The social workers, who
worked for the Kentucky Department of Social Services, were indicted two
months after 22-month-old Daniel Thomas Reynolds was beaten to death
22' See K.R.S. § 508.010(2).
' See id. § 532.060(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1996).
2 See id. § 508.100 (Michie 1990).
See id. § 532.060(2)(c) (Michie Supp. 1996).
See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 874.
26 See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
" See generally Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Tort Liability of Public
Authority for Failure to Remove Parentally Abused or Neglected Children from
Parents' Custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942 (1988).
" See Joseph Gerth, Social Workers Cleared in Death but Trial Prompts State




by his stepfather Robert Wayne Parker.129 Parker was convicted of
murder 230 In June 1993, six months before Daniel's death, the social
workers had been contacted by a day-care worker, who reported bruises on
Daniel's buttocks and suspected cigarette bums on his feet.231 A week later,
nurses at the local hospital where Daniel was being treated for bronchitis
noticed a swelling in his leg. Daniel was diagnosed with a spiral leg
fracture and sent to the University of Kentucky Medical Center. A staff
social worker there reached the conclusion that Daniel had been intention-
ally injured and obtained a 72-hour protective hold on the boy.12 An
emergency protective order was sought and Daniel was temporarily placed
with his grandparents. Two months later, in August 1993, Daniel was
returned to his parents' custody by court order.233 The Wayne County social
workers had sessions with the family in the last months of Daniel's life,
and during one of them in October, the social workers discovered bruises
on the child. Two months later, in December, Daniel died of severe trauma
to the head." Claiming that the social workers had a legal duty to prevent
the beating death of Daniel, 5 the prosecution argued that they had
"overlooked obvious signs of abuse and that they should have asked that
Daniel be removed from his home." 6 The jury deliberated less than 90
minutes in finding the social workers not guilty of complicity."l
Justice Wintersheimer wrote for the Lane plurality: "In view of the
natural relationship between parent and guardian, K.R.S. 620.010 creates
an affirmative duty for parents and guardians to prevent physical injury
which results in an assault on the child. Others covered by the statute have
an obligation to report which is a different duty."'' 8 The plurality appeared
to distinguish the duties created by Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised








235 See Joseph Gerth, Lawyers Rest Defense of Four Social Workers, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 28, 1995, at B5.
26 Gerth, supra note 228, at Al.
237 See id.
231 Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1067 (1998).
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prevent abuse of their child, and violation of this duty can result in criminal
liability.u 9 Those specified by the reporting statute have a duty to report.24°
The plurality seemed to suggest that the duty to report is different from the
duty to prevent abuse and is an insufficient ground on which to base
complicity liability;24 however, the plurality opinion does not make this
clear. This ambiguity will need to be addressed. Such expansive complicity
liability is not likely to be what the legislature intended in enacting the
reporting statute, nor is it likely that the plurality intended to impose
complicity liability on doctors, teachers, and social workers.
Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides a penalty for
a violation of the reporting statute. Under section 620.990, an intentional
violation is a Class B misdemeanor,242 which carries a sentence of up to
ninety days in jail243 and/or a fine not to exceed $250.21 The maximum
time a person can be sentenced to prison for assault in the first degree, a
Class B felony,24 is twenty years, and the minimum is ten years.2 6 This
disparity between the penalty for a reporting statute violation and the
penalty for assault in the first degree further demonstrates the legislature's
lack of intent to impose complicity liability on those listed in the reporting
statute.
CONCLUSION
With such a divided court, the Lane decision did not fully resolve the
issue of a parent's legal duty to prevent the abuse of his or her child. While
the plurality held that a parent does have a legal duty to prevent the assault
of his or her child, the court split as to the origin of this legal duty. "Four
justices found the duty does not exist in K.R.S. Chapter 620; five justices
found it does not exist due to any 'special relationship' exhibited in the
common law or in other caselaw."247 The court's close decision has left the
future of this issue uncertain.
239 See id. at 875.
24" See K.R.S. § 620.030(2) (Michie 1990).
241 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 875-76.
242 See K.R.S. § 620.990.
243 See id. § 532.090.
2 See id. § 534.040 (Michie Supp. 1996).
24 See id. § 508.010(2) (Michie 1990).
246 See id. § 532.060(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1996).
247 Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 1, Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d
874 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998) (No. 95-SC-941-DG).
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As the Lane dissent noted, the legislature defines what is criminal
conduct and "sets forth the mechanism ofpunishment, not the judiciary."248
The plurality has overstepped its bounds by finding a legislative intent to
create a legal duty in Chapter 620 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The
criminal abuse statutes249 make it a criminal offense for a person to allow
a child of whom he or she has custody to be abused. These statutes
criminalizing the passive parent's conduct exhibit the legislature's intent
to have this. conduct fall under the criminal abuse statutes, and not under
the complicity statute. Pursuant to the Lane decision, prosecutors may
charge passive parents with either criminal abuse or complicity,20 which
will result in inconsistent sentences for identical behavior.
Finally, by basing the legal duty to prevent abuse on the reporting
statute, the Lane opinion subjects the professionals specified in the statute
- doctors, teachers, social workers, and others - to criminal complicity
charges for failing to report or otherwise prevent the abuse of a child. This
expansive complicity liability is hardly what the legislature intended in
enacting the reporting statute.
24 Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 883 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
249 K.R.S. §§ 508.100-.120 (Michie 1990).
50 See Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 876.
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